THE USERS OF LUMBER AND THE US-CANADA SOFTWOOD LUMBER AGREEMENT: AN EVENT STUDY by Malhotra, Nisha & Gulati, Sumeet
The Users of Lumber and the US-Canada Softwood Lumber 
Agreement: An Event Study 




December 04, 2003 
























Food and Resource Economics, University of British Columbia 
Vancouver, Canada, V6T 1Z4 
http://www.agsci.ubc.ca/fre 
                                                 
# Nisha Malhotra is a Sessional Lecturer at the Department of Economics at the University of British 
Columbia, and Sumeet Gulati is at Food and Resource Economics at the University of British Columbia,.  
Please address all correspondence to Nisha Malhotra, 213-2875 Osoyoos Crescent, Vancouver, V6T 2G3, 
Canada; phone: (604) 221-5780, email: malhotra@econ.umd.edu The Users of Lumber and the SLA: An Event Study
Abstract
In this paper we analyze whether the Softwood Lumber Agreement between US
and Canada imposed signiﬁcant economic costs on the users of Lumber in the US.
To ascertain this impact we use an event study. Our event study analyzes variations
in the stock prices of lumber using ﬁrms listed at the major stock markets in the
US. We ﬁnd that events leading to the Softwood Lumber Agreement had signiﬁcant
negative impacts on the stock prices of industries using softwood lumber. The
average reduction of stock prices for our sample of ﬁrms was approximately 5.42%
over all the events considered.
Key Words and Phrases: SLA, International Trade Disputes, Event Study
JEL Classiﬁcations. Primary: F13;S e c o n d a r y :G1.
21 Introduction
The softwood lumber trade dispute between the US and Canada can be traced back
to a countervailing duty investigation by US authorities in 1982/83. The US claimed,
and still claims, that fees charged for harvesting softwood on public lands by certain
Canadian provincial governments are artiﬁcially low. It also claims that artiﬁcially
low fees set by provincial governments constitute countervailable subsidies.
A recent bilateral settlement of this dispute was the Softwood Lumber Agreement
(SLA). Signed in May 1996, under the Softwood Lumber Agreement the ﬁrst 14.7
Billion Board Feet (BBF) of softwood lumber exports from Alberta, British Columbia,
Ontario, and Quebec would enter the US market duty free. The ﬁrst 650 million board
feet over 14.7 BBF were subject to a tax of $50 per thousand board feet. Further
exports were subject to a tax of $100 per thousand board feet.
The question addressed in this paper is: what is the eﬀect of restricting Canadian
exports on industries that use lumber in the US? Restrictions on Canadian lumber
exports raise lumber prices in the United States. While this raises proﬁts for US
lumber producers, it also raises costs for lumber using (or downstream) industries.
Lindsey et. al. (2000) estimate that the fees on additional shipments due to the SLA
raise the cost of lumber in an average new home by 800 - 1300 US Dollars. They also
estimate that for every $50 increase in the price of 1,000 board feet of framing lumber,
300,000 potential homeowners are priced out of the housing market. When customers
can no longer aﬀord to buy homes, suppliers lose business and their employees suﬀer.
3Furthermore, less remodeling is done when the cost of key materials, such as lumber,
rises. A reduction in the demand for housing and remodeling, aﬀects home builders
and manufactured-home builders. Lumber dealers who supply home builders and
manufacturers are also hurt by reduced residential construction.
To assess the eﬀect of restricting Canadian exports on industries that use lumber,
we use an event study.3 The event study allows us to assess the impact of events
leading to the Softwood Lumber Agreement. We assume that capital markets are
eﬃcient, and can evaluate the impact of new information on a ﬁrm’s expected future
proﬁts. This implies that ‘abnormal’ changes in a ﬁrm’s stock price can be inter-
preted as the present discounted value of future gains or losses expected due to the
agreement.4
We consider three events. The ﬁrst event date is February 2, 1996. Seeing that
negotiations between US and Canadian governments had made little headway, on
February 2, 1996 the Council for Fair Lumber Imports (CFLI - a coalition representing
US lumber interests) announced its own deadline. It announced its intention to ﬁle
a petition for a countervailing duty if an agreement between US and Canada was
3An event study is an empirical study of prices of an asset just before and after some event, like
an announcement, merger, or dividend.
4To calculate ‘abnormal’ returns we ﬁrst calculate the relationship between the ﬁrm’s stock price
and the stock market in the absence of the event under consideration (in this case the Softwood
Lumber Agreement). This relationship generates predicted returns in the absence of the agreement.
These predicted returns are then compared with the actual returns on the event dates (dates speciﬁc
to the agreement) giving us abnormal returns.
4not reached by February 15th, 1996. The second event date is February 15, 1996,
this day an agreement between the two countries was reached in principle. The ﬁnal
event date we consider is April 3, 1996, this day Canada ﬁnalized the agreement
and announced its details. We ﬁnd that events leading to the Softwood Lumber
Agreement had signiﬁcant negative impacts on the stock prices of industries using
softwood lumber. The average reduction of stock prices for our sample of ﬁrms was
approximately 1.5% for each of the ﬁrst two events. For the ﬁnal event (Canada
ﬁnalizing the agreement) the average reduction in stock prices was signiﬁcantly higher
at approximately 2.5%. Cumulating the losses over all three events, we ﬁnd that the
average reduction in stock prices for the ﬁrms in our sample was 5.42%, indicating
that the Softwood Lumber Agreement imposed signiﬁcant economic costs on the users
of lumber.5
This paper is not the ﬁrst to study stock price changes in response to bilateral
agreements. In a related study, Begley et al. (1998) assess the impact of export taxes
(imposed during the Memorandum of Understanding (1986-91)) on the stock prices
of the producers of Canadian Lumber. Lenway et al. (1996) examine the returns
to the steel industry from the trigger price mechanism of 1977 and 1980, and the
voluntary export restrictions of 1982 and 1984. Ries (1993) examines the eﬀect of
5Disaggregatin amongst the users of lumber, we ﬁnd that retailers and wholesalers of lumber and
other building materials (Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation (SIC) 5211) had the largest depreciation
in their market value (at -12.99%). Single-family housing construction ﬁrms (SIC 1521) were next
at -6.19%.
5voluntary export restraint agreements in 1981 on proﬁts in the Japanese automobile
industry. Most of these papers evaluate the industry directly aﬀected by the trade
policy (the exporting or the import competing industry). This paper is one of the
few to evaluate the impact of a trade agreement on an indirectly eﬀected industry
(in this case the users of the restricted good).
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we provide a brief history of
the US-Canadian softwood lumber dispute. In Section 3 we describe our event study.
In Section 4 we discuss the data and its sources. We present the results in Section 5,
and conclude in Section 6.
2 The US-Canada Softwood Lumber Dispute: A Brief History6
In Table 1 we list the main countervailing duty investigations involving softwood lum-
ber and their outcomes. The ﬁrst countervailing investigation is commonly termed
Softwood Lumber I. Concern over rising Canadian lumber imports resulted in a
petition for a Countervailing Duty (CVD) in October 1982. The petition alleged
that Canadian Provincial and Federal governments were subsidizing softwood lum-
ber production by selling the right to cut timber on public lands at artiﬁcially low
prices. In the ensuing investigation the International Trade Administration (ITA),
a dispute settlement body in the US Department of Commerce, ruled that Canada’s
policies regarding allocation and pricing of softwood lumber did not constitute a
6For a more comprehensive description of the US-Canada lumber dispute please see Braudo and
Trebilcock (2002).
6countervailable subsidy to its softwood lumber industry.7
The dispute was revived in May 1986 by US interests grouped under the Coalition
for Fair Lumber Imports (CFLI). The Coalition requested US authorities to impose
a countervailing duty on Canada’s softwood lumber exports to the US. In this new
phase (called Softwood Lumber II), the facts of the case as well as the applicable law
had not materially changed from the ﬁrst phase in 1982/83. However, the Canadian
share of the US softwood lumber market had risen from 28.5 percent in 1983 to 31.6
percent in 1985 (see Gagné (1999)). This time the International Trade Administration
reversed its prior decision. It found Canadian stumpage rates to be countervailable,
and imposed a 15 percent provisional duty.8 In December 1986, US and Canada
agreed to a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) under which Canada imposed a
15 percent tax on its exports to the US.
In Canada there was resentment against the MOU. Further, during this period
British Columbia (the single largest exporter of softwood lumber) replaced its ex-
port charge by permanently increased stumpage rates. In October 1991, Canada
unilaterally terminated the Memorandum of Understanding. This was met almost
immediately by interim duties on Canadian lumber. A third countervailing duty
investigation (Softwood Lumber III) was initiated. In May 1992, the ITA issued a
7The ‘speciﬁcity test’ of an export subsidy was not met. This was because this stumpage rate
was valid for all producers and did not target exporters speciﬁcally.
8The diﬀerence between stumpage revenues received by provincial governments and applicable
government costs was used to determine whether subsidy existed.
7ﬁnal determination which set the countevailing duty at 6.51 percent.9 Subsequently,
Canada appealed the ruling at the dispute settlement body of the Canada US Trade
Agreement (CUSTA).
A prolonged period of litigation under the CUSTA followed.10 The duty imposed
was disallowed by CUSTA, and ﬁnally revoked by the US government in 1994. Fol-
lowing this revocation a period of mostly free trade followed. This was a phase of
euphoria in bilateral relations between US and Canada. When President Clinton vis-
ited Ottawa (February 1995) after the North American Free Trade Agreement both
US and Canadian governments viewed trade disputes such as Softwood Lumber as
minor irritants in a phase of increasing integration (as reported by Leo Ryan in a
news report for the Journal of Commerce on February 23rd 1995).
Nevertheless, in late 1995 there was renewed pressure on the US government to
limit softwood imports. Given that the Canadian softwood lumber industry had
incurred large litigation costs to win Softwood Lumber III they were willing to look
for a negotiated bilateral solution. Despite ongoing negotiations, on February 2,
1996 the US coalition for fair lumber imports announced its intentions to petition
if no pact was reached by February 15th. Under this pressure, the ﬁve year SLA ,
9The methodolgy used to determine the counterviable duty dﬀered from the one used in the
Softwood Lumber II. This time round the ﬁnding of subsidy was based on the diﬀerence between
stumapge rates under the small business program in Canada and rates of major licenses.
10The panels overturned ITA’s and ITC’s ﬁndings. The US went on to challenge the panel’s
decision. After a further investigation the panel upheld its previous decision.
8(from April 1, 1996 to March, 31, 2001), was accepted by both the sides. Even these
ﬁve years of SLA were marred by further disputes. The US customs, on at least three
occasions, reclassiﬁed products from tariﬀ codes outside the SLA into codes covered
by the agreement. Also, during this period British Columbia’s stumpage reduction
was challenged by the US under the dispute settlement provisions of the agreement.
3 An Event Study
3.1 The Market Model
This event study is based on the market model, relating the return of an individual
ﬁrm’s stock to the return of a market index and a ﬁrm-speciﬁcc o n s t a n t .
Rit = ai + BiRmt + eit, (1)
where Rit is ﬁrm i’s return at date t; Rmt is the return of the value weighted
NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ index at date t; ai and Bi, are the parameters to be esti-
mated; and eit is a serially uncorrelated error term with mean 0 and constant variance
σ2
i for stock i.
The above traditional market model equation can be expanded to include separate
dummy variables for each event date. Thus, an event window of N observations
requires N dummy variables. The estimated equation is of the following form:
Rit = ai + BiRmt +
T+N X
n=t+1
EWntAin + eit (2)
(t =1 ,..T, T+1 ,....T + N); (i =1 ,2,.....,I),
9where EWnt is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for the nth day of the event
window and 0 otherwise, and the Ain are additional parameters to be estimated.
Equation 2 is estimated using ordinary least squares.
The coeﬃcient of the dummy variable (EW) is the abnormal return (A).
b Ait = Rit − (ˆ ai + ˆ BiRmt) t = T +1 ,....T + N.
There are I set of equations, one for each ﬁrm, with (T + N) observations for each
i. In the above model, the estimation period for the slope and the intercept is
(t =1 ,...,T). These T observations without the dummy variables determine the
estimated slope and the intercept as well as the estimated variance s2
i . The estimation
period for the market model is 365 days, beginning 396 days prior to the event t0 and
ending 30 days before the event, as shown in Figure 1. The remaining N observations
(t = T +1 ,....T + N) include the event dummies and do not aﬀect the estimated
slope, since the observations in the event window are “dummied out”. There are N
days in the event window. The Ain coeﬃcients for these N observations are nothing
but the prediction errors or the abnormal returns.11 See Appendix A.1 for further








; t =1 ,2,3.....T.
The dummy variables can be aggregated to obtain cumulative daily abnormal
11Also, the variance s
2
i is estimated with the ﬁrst T observations, since the regression residuals for
the event window, the last N observations, are zero.
12Refer to Appendix A.2 for more detail on the variance and covariance for abnormal return.
10returns (CA). Over an interval of two or more trading days beginning with day T +1















Abnormal returns by design exhibit sampling error. The abnormal return, b Ai,h a s
an expected mean of zero and covariance matrix given by13




T = Estimation Period; N = Event Window
where XT is a matrix of explanatory variables over the estimation period and XN
a matrix of explanatory variables over the event window. The covariance matrix,
V ( b Ai), has two parts. The ﬁrst term in the covariance matrix is the variance due
to random disturbances and the second term is the additional variance due to the
sampling error in (ˆ a, ˆ B) (prediction outside the estimation period).14 Testing for the
statistical signiﬁcance of CA (aggregated abnormal returns over the event window)
13Refer to Appendix A.2 for more detail on the covariance of abnormal return.
14Refer to Appendix A.2 for more detail on the variance and covariance for abnormal return.
11requires us to account for this sampling error, which further leads to serial correlation
of the abnormal returns.15 Abnormal returns are serially correlated despite the fact
that the true disturbances, eit, are independent across time.
Furthermore, it is reasonable to believe that there exists cross-sectional contem-
poraneous correlation between the returns of ﬁrms belonging to the same industry;
this is referred to as industry clustering. The cross-sectional correlation of shocks
within an industry cannot be eliminated by controlling for the market return, since
the correlation within the same industry is generally over and above that of the
market.
A test statistic introduced by Boehmer, Musumeci and Poulsen (1991) is used to
test for statistical signiﬁcance of cumulated abnormal returns16. This test statistic is
an extension of the standardized abnormal return test (also known as the Patell test)
and corrects for both serial correlation and contemporaneous correlation. Boehmer
et al. (1991) report that this test is well speciﬁed and quite powerful.
4D a t a
4.1 Consumers of Softwood Lumber
Our sample of lumber using industry (also referred to as downstream industry) draws
from the membership of the American Consumers for Aﬀordable Homes (ACAH).
15For a ﬁrm, all the abnormal returns estimate use the same intercept and slope parameters.
16Please see the appendix A.3 for more detail on the test statistic used.
12The ACAH claims that it represents approximately 95 percent of softwood lumber
use in the US.17 However, not all members of this associations are direct consumers
or users of softwood lumber. In the US, softwood lumber is largely used for con-
structing new homes and remodeling existing structures. It is also used for building
manufactured homes. Accordingly, we shortlist ﬁrms from the ACAH that belong to
the following four digit Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation (SIC). These are: SIC 1521
(Single-Family Housing Construction), SIC 1531 (Operative Builders), 2451(Mobile
Homes), and 2452 (Prefabricated Wood Buildings). Besides the direct users, we also
include suppliers, in other words, the wholesale lumber dealers, their relevant SIC
code is 5211 (Lumber and other Building Materials).18
Depending on the availability of stock price data we shortened the list further.
Our data for stock price data comes from the Centre for Research on Security Prices
(CRSP) database. We use ﬁrms that were listed either on the American Stock
exchange (AMEX) or the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). We also require the
17The members of ACAH include CHEP USA, Citizens for a Sound Economy, Consumers for
World Trade, Free Trade Lumber Council, The Home Depot, International Mass Retail Association,
International Sleep Products Association, Leggett & Platt Inc., Manufactured Housing Association
for Regulatory Reform, Manufactured Housing Institute, National Association of Home Builders,
National Black Chamber of Commerce, National Lumber and Building Material Dealers Association,
National Retail Federation, and the United States Hispanic Contractors Association (source: the
website for ACAH).
18We further checked the websites of these ﬁr m st oc o n ﬁrm that they either used softwood lumber
as an input or were softwood lumber dealers.
13availability of stock price data during the entire time period relevant for the SLA.
T h er e l e v a n tt i m ep e r i o db e g i n say e a rb e f o r et h eﬁrst news report regarding possible
export restrictions in 1995 and ends 40 days after the last news report regarding the
SLA. This process of elimination leaves us with data for 37 ﬁrms.
In Table 5 we list all the ﬁrms used in this analysis. The last two columns include
their ranking in terms of revenue in the domestic industry.19 Af e wl a r g eﬁrms can
be classiﬁed into both Single Family Housing and Operative Builders. We sorted
these ﬁrms into a single classiﬁcation depending on their ranking and their primary
SIC listing in the Compustat Database.20 However, as most of the industry leaders
are being considered, the sample does represent a signiﬁcant share of the market.21
The Single-Family Housing Construction industry is highly fragmented and dis-
persed.22 The industry consists of contractors that are primarily engaged in building,
remodeling, and repairing houses. Some large contractors in the industry are also
listed as operative builders. However, around 75 percent of the establishments engage
solely in the construction of single-family housing. In 1997, the ﬁve largest contrac-
tors accounted for 14 percent of the revenue share in the industry, their total revenue
19 The revenue share data is drawn from Gale Group (2001a, b, and c).
20For example, Centex Corporation (refer to Table 5), which ranked 1 under SIC 1531 and 2 in
SIC 1521, was placed under SIC 1521. In case the ranking was not available we placed them under
their primary SIC, as speciﬁed in the Compustat Database.
21 The revenue share data is drawn from Gale Group (2001a, b, and c).
22Much of the descriptive information below regarding each industry is drawn from Gale Group
(2001a, 2001b, and 2001c).
14being $11.3 billion. The industry revenue leader, Pulte Corporation, accounted for
2.3 percent of the housing starts. Other large single-family home contractors include
Centex Corporation, Kaufman & Broad Home Corporation, D. R Horton and Lennar
Corporation.
Operative Builders account for a smaller percentage of construction. Their also
undertake site development, real estate management activities, land acquisition, land
sales and other miscellaneous operations. Unlike general contractors, operative
builders own the structures they erect and act as their own general contractors. The
largest operative builder, in 1999, with sales of $5.2 billion was Centex Corporation
followed by Pulte Corporation, Ryland Group, Toll Brothers and Beazer homes.
Lindsey et. al. (2000) provide the information that in 1997, 23.8 percent of
single-family housing starts, and 30.5 percent of new single-family homes sold were
Manufactured Homes.23 In other words, this too is also an important industry for
our analysis. This industry is relatively more concentrated. There are only 88
manufactured home corporations in the US, and in 1998, the top 10 manufactured
home producers accounted for 78 percent of total industry shipments. The industry
leader was Champion Enterprises, followed by Fleetwood Enterprises, Oakwood Home
Corporation, Clayton Homes, and Cavalier Homes.
23According to Lindsey et. al. (2000), this ﬁgure was calculated at the request of the National
Association of Home Builders by the Bureau of the Census. The calculation was based on Census
Bureau analysis described in Howard A. Savage, “Who Could Aﬀord to Buy a House in 1995,”
Current Housing Reports, H121/99-1, August 1999.
15Several types of establishments fall into the Retail Lumber and Building Mate-
rials category. The largest categories, by far, are Lumber Yards, Home Centers and
Warehouse Home Centers. The industry leaders are Home Depot, Lowes, Menard
Incorporated (a private ﬁrm not listed on any stock exchange), and The 84 Lumber
Company (also a private ﬁrm).
4.2 Event Dates
To ﬁnd the dates for public media announcements related to the SLA, we use two
databases. These are the Lexis Nexis Academic Database and the Business and
Company Resource Center of Gale Group Database. In Table 2 we list what we
consider to be the three important announcements or events related to the SLA.
The second column of the table contains the headline for the news report and the
third column lists the news source in which the report was published.
The ﬁrst event date considered is February 2, 1996. On this date the Council for
Fair Lumber Imports (CFLI - a coalition representing US lumber interests) announced
its intent to ﬁle a petition for a countervailing duty if an agreement between US and
Canada was not reached by February 15th, 1996. This announcement was probably
prompted by the lack of progress made in the negotiations between US and Canadian
governments. The second event date considered is February 15, 1996. On this day,
under pressure from the CFLI announcement, an agreement between US and Canada
was reached and announced in principle. The ﬁnal event date we consider is April 3,
161996. On this day Canada ﬁnalized the Softwood Lumber Agreement and announced
its details.
5R e s u l t s
We expect the Softwood Lumber Agreement to have a negative impact on the users
of lumber. We also ﬁnd results consistent with that hypothesis. Protection for
the domestic lumber industry in the form of the Softwood Lumber Industry had a
signiﬁc a n t l yn e g a t i v ei m p a c to nt h em a r k e tv a l u eo fﬁrms that use lumber as an
input. In Table 3 we report the stock price response for the users of lumber to the
three events listed above. The Average Cumulative Abnormal returns (ACA) for the
event window (-1,+1) (cumulating the average return of ﬁrms from one day before
the news release to one day after the news release) is reported in the table. The
ACA is signiﬁcantly negative for all events.
For the ﬁrst event, that is the warning by the CFLI (or US producers), the ACA is
signiﬁcantly negative at the 5 percent level. The second event, the day the agreement
was announced in principle, had a relatively smaller, but still statistically signiﬁcant,
eﬀect on the stock prices. There are two possible reasons for this smaller impact.
The ﬁrst being that the market anticipated this announcement. If the threat by
C F L Iw a ss e e na sc r e d i b l e ,t h em a r k e tw o u ld have anticipated the announcement of
the agreement on the second event date (the earlier threat included this event date
as a deadline). The second reason could be that the market did not consider the
17agreement announced as being credible. Till a few hours before the agreement was
announced several Canadian provincial representatives disagreed over the details of
the SLA.24 The disagreement between Provinces was widely known and is likely to
have reduced the market’s expectation about whether the SLA would be ﬁnalized or
not. Consistent with the second possible reason above, the ﬁnal signing of the SLA
greatly caused signiﬁcant depreciation in the market value of our sample of lumber
using ﬁrms. We ﬁnd a negative 2.38% abnormal return during this event, signiﬁcant
at the 1 percent level. In the sixth column of Table 3 we report the number of ﬁrms
with positive and negative average abnormal returns for the event window.
For all three events, ﬁrms with negative returns outnumber the ﬁrms with positive
returns. For the ﬁnal event, when Canada ﬁnalized the agreement, the number of
ﬁrms that lost market value are more than three times those that gained value. In the
last column of Table 3 we report the test statistic for the generalized sign test. This
tests whether the fraction of positive returns for the event window is the same as in
those during the estimation period. For each of the events the null hypothesis that the
number of positive returns is the same as those during the event window is rejected.
In other words, the decrease in the number of ﬁrms losing value during each event is
statistically signiﬁcant. For the ﬁnal event, when Canada ﬁnalized the agreement, 28
of the 37 ﬁrms reported negative abnormal returns, and this is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from similar ratios during the estimation period at the 1 percent level.
24There are some details regarding this disagreement in the newsreport regarding the announce-
ment of this agreement.
18We add the cumulative abnormal returns for all three events to obtain the Total
Cumulative Abnormal Return(TACA). In Table 4 we present the TACA for each of
the 4 digit SIC industry considered (1521, 1531, 2451 & 2452, 5211 and others). The
results suggest that the response to SLA varied across industries. Firms belonging
to SIC 5211 (Lumber and Other Building Materials) had the largest depreciation in
their market value. Their TACA was -12.99% and is signiﬁcant at the 1 percent
level. The next largest impact occurred in Single-Family Housing Construction.
Their TACA was -6.19% and was signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. Though TACA
for SICs 1531, 2451 and 2452 are negative, they are not statistically signiﬁcant.
This is probably because the consumption of softwood lumber in Mobile Homes and
Prefabricated Wood Buildings is relatively small. Also, ﬁrms belonging to Operative
Builders (SIC 1531) are involved in many other activities like site development work,
real estate management activities, land acquisition, and land sales. The impact on
these ﬁr m si st h u sl i k e l yt ob el e s st h a nf o rﬁrms belonging to Single-Family Housing
Construction, where 75 percent of establishments engage in the same single activity.
In the last row of Table 4 we present results cumulated for all three events, for all ﬁrms
in our sample. We ﬁnd that the market value of all ﬁrms in our sample depreciated
by 5.42 percent, and this is signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
We test the sensitivity of these results to the deﬁnition of the event window by
trying other event windows. In Table 6, we report TACA for various event windows.
Irrespective of the deﬁnition of an event window the TACA is negative and signiﬁcant
19at the 5 percent level, and point estimates are similar across windows. We report
the results for an event window of 5 days, (-2,+2) in Tables 7 and 8. As with the
3 day event window, the last event (Canada’s ﬁnalizing of the agreement) had the
biggest impact, and again this is signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. The other events
also reduced market value but the reduction is not statistically signiﬁcant for the ﬁrst
event. Even at the industry level results do not vary much across event windows.
We conclude that the SLA was detrimental to the users of lumber. This is especially
true for Lumber Dealers and the Single Family Construction Industry.
6C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we evaluate whether the Softwood Lumber Agreement had a signiﬁcant
economic impact on the industrial users of lumber. To ascertain the impact of the
SLA on users of lumber we study stock price variations of lumber using ﬁrms. We
ﬁnd that events leading to the Softwood Lumber Agreement brought about large and
statistically signiﬁcant reductions in the stock values of the ﬁrms in our sample. If
we assume that the stock market processes information eﬃciently this reduction in
stock value can be interpreted as the economic loss expected from the SLA.
Nevertheless, a few caveats are due. This study analyzes the major industrial
users of lumber alone. We do not include the ﬁnal consumers of lumber, for example,
the homeowners. It is likely that the economic costs of the Softwood Lumber Agree-
ment would be even larger if this group were included. Further, we only include
20ﬁrms listed in the major stock exchanges in the US. While we believe that our sam-
ple covers a signiﬁcant share of the relevant industries, it is important to remember
that the sample is not comprehensive.
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A Appendix
A.1 Methodology
For each ﬁrm the equation is :
R = XZ + e
where R is a [(T +N)∗1] vector; X is [(T +N)∗(2+N)] matrix; Z is a [(2+N)∗1]
vector of coeﬃcients; and e is a [(T + N) ∗ 1] vector.










Where XT is a [T ∗ 2] matrix and XN is a [N ∗ 2] matrix. The upper right hand
corner is a [T ∗ N] matrix of zeros, and the lower right hand corner is a [N ∗ N]
identity matrix. The estimated coeﬃcient matrix is:
23b Z =[ X0X]−1[X0Y ]





































Since there is a dummy variable for each day in the event window that takes the
value 1 on the nth day and 0 otherwise. Only the ﬁrst T observations without the
dummies are used to estimate the slope and the parameters b Z0
T =ˆ ai, ˆ B, as is in the
traditional market model. b A are the abnormal returns which are estimated using the
estimates of ˆ ai, ˆ B from the ﬁrst T observations and is reduced to RN − XN b ZT.
A.2 Covariance
In order to design a statistic to test the signiﬁcance of ACA, characteristics of abnor-
mal returns needs to be studied in a little more detail. Abnormal return by design
exhibit sampling error. Abnormal return, b Ai, has an expected mean of zero and the





T = Estimation Period; N = Event Window
24where XT is the matrix of explanatory variables over the estimation period and
XN is the matrix of explanatory variables over the event window. The covariance
matrix, V ( b Ai), has two parts. The ﬁrst term in the covariance matrix is the vari-
ance due to random disturbances and the second term is the additional variance
due to the sampling error.25 The maximum likelihood estimate of the variance























Testing for the statistical signiﬁcance of CA (aggregated abnormal returns over
the event window) is complicated by serial correlation of the abnormal returns.27 Ab-
normal returns are serially correlated despite the fact that the true disturbances, eit,
are independent through time. The variance of the cumulative abnormal return, given
serial correlation in the series of abnormal return, is equal to the sum of the variances





25Due to prediction outside the estimation period.
26In other words variance of abnormal return.
27For a ﬁrm, all the abnormal returns estimates use the same intercept and slope parameters.
28var(CA)=var(At)+2 ( ( T + N) − (T +1 )− 1)cov(At,A t+1)
25where i is a (N ∗ 1) unit vector. In other words for an event window that extends
f r o mt = 1t ot = N t h ee s t i m a t eo fc o v a r i a n c ei s






























The following Z statistics is used to test for the statistical signiﬁcance of cumulated


















The following Z statistic is used to test for the statistical signiﬁcance of the total







The market response for each event should be independent of the others, since











Figure 1: The Estimation Period 
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Table 1: History of the Softwood Lumber Agreement 
 
Countervailing Duty Investigations  Outcome 
Softwood Lumber I: 1982  US authorities decided no subsidy 
 
Softwood Lumber II: 1986  15% provisional duty.  
 
Replaced by 15% export tax in MOU 
 














After Canada unilaterally terminates MOU 
 
Countervailing case filed: Interim bonding 
requirement 
 
Canada wins appeal against countervailing duty in 
CUSTA (1993 and 1994) 
 
US revokes duties against Canadian lumber (Aug 
1994) 
 




Threat of  a Countervailing Duty Investigation : 
1996 
 
Softwood Lumber Agreement  is signed:  
The first 650 million board feet over 14.7 BBF was 
subject to a tax of $50 per thousand board feet, and 
any further exports were subject to a tax of $100 per 
































Important Events  Headlines  Article 
    
Event 1: February 2, 1996 
(Warning by US Producers) 
 
Trade Reprisals Loom For Canada US Group Sets 
Feb. 15
th Deadline for Lumber Pact 
The Journal of 
Commerce Inc.  
Event 2: February 15, 1996 
(Agreement Reached in 
Principle) 
 
US Lumber Industry Welcomes Agreement in 
Principle over Subsidized Canadian Imports 
PR Newswire 
Association Inc. 
Event 3: April 3, 1996 
(Canada Finalizes the 
Agreement) 
 
Canada Agrees to Tax Softwood Exports to US. 
Ottowa-Washington Deal Averts another Trade War 
over Lumber 
The Journal of 
Commerce Inc. 
 



































EVENT News No.  of 
firms 
ACA Z  STAT  Positive: 
Negative 
Z Stat 
event 1  Warning by US Producers 
37 -1.50%  -2.61**  13:24  -1.42* 
event 2  Agreement Reached in Principle 
 37  -1.45%  -2.63**  11:26  -2.08** 
event 3  Canada Finalizes the Agreement 
  37 -2.47%  -3.18***  9:28  -2.74*** 
 
  
* significant at 10% confidence interval level; **  significant at 5 % confidence interval level;  







Table 4: Stock Price Response, Cumulated over all events
a , by 4-Digit SIC,  
Event Window (-1, +1) 
                                         
 
 
SIC 3-digit  Industries  Event Window No. of firms  TACA  Z STAT 
1521 
Single-family Housing Construction & 
Residential Construction, Nec  (-2,+2) 9  -6.19%  -2.90***
1531 Operative  Builders (-2,+2)  11  -4.22%  -0.88 
2451 & 2452 
Mobile Homes & Prefabricated Wood 
Buildings (-2,+2)  11  -1.88%  0.04 
5211  Lumber and Other Building Materials  (-2,+2)  6  -12.99%  -2.08** 
ALL ALL  (-2,+2)  37  -5.42%  -1.84** 
 
  
* significant at 10% confidence interval level; **  significant at 5 % confidence interval level;  
*** significant at 1 % confidence interval level 
aevent 1 : US producers warn they will petition if no pact by feb15th; event 2 : Agreement in principle 
reached; event 3 : Canada finalizes the SLA agreement 
b Others consists of 4-digit SICs: 2515-Mattresses and Bedsprings; 5031-Lumber, Plywood, and Millwork; 
5271-Mobile Home Dealers 
 
 Table 5: Names of Firms Used in the Analysis and their Classifications 
 
Names  4-Digit SIC   Ranking* 
 For 1521 
Ranking* 
for 1531 
      
B M C WEST CORP  5211     
BEAZER HOMES USA  1531    7 
CALPROP CORP  1521     
CAPITAL PACIFIC H  1521     
CAVALIER HOMES IN  1531     
CENTEX CORP  1531  2  1 
CHAMPION ENTERPRI  2451     
CLAYTON HOMES INC  2451     
D R HORTON INC  1521  4   
DYNAMIC HOMES INC  2451     
ENGLE HOMES INC  1531    6 
FLEETWOOD ENTERPR 2451     
GROSSMANS INC  5211     
HOME DEPOT INC  5211     
HOVNANIAN ENTER A  1531    8 
KAUFMAN & BROAD H  1521  3   
LENNAR CORP  1531  6   
LIBERTY HOMES I B  2452     
LOWES COMPANIES I  5211     
M D C HOLDINGS IN  1531     
M I SCHOTTENSTEIN  1531     
MANUFACTURED HOME  1521     
N V R INC  1531     
NOBILITY HOMES IN  2451     
OAKWOOD HOMES COR  2451     
PULTE CORP  1521  1  2 
RYLAND GROUP INC  1531  7  3 
SKYLINE CORP  2451     
SOUTHERN ENERGY H  2452     
STANDARD PACIFIC  1531     
STARRETT HOUSING  1521     
TOLL BROTHERS INC  1531     
U S HOME CORP  1521  8  4 
UNITED MOBILE HOM  2451     
WEITZER HOMEBUI A  1521     
WICKES LUMBER CO  5211     
WOLOHAN LUMBER CO  5211     
•  Ranking in terms of level of revenue. 






Table 6: Stock Price Response for all the events
a; 
Various Event Windows 
 
 
Event Window  No. of firms  TACA  Z STAT 
(-1,+1) 37  -5.42%  -1.84** 
(-2,+2) 37  -5.11%  -2.03** 
(-3,+3) 37  -3.55%  -2.27** 
(-5,+5) 37  -5.10%  -2.19** 
 
 
* significant at 10% confidence interval level; **  significant at 5 % confidence interval level;  
*** significant at 1 % confidence interval level 
aevent 1 : US producers warn they will petition if no pact by feb15th; event 2 : Agreement in principle 









Table 7: Stock Price Response to SLA; Event Window (-2, +2) 
 
EVENT News No.  of 
firms 
ACA Z  STAT  Positive: 
Negative 
Z Stat 
event 1  Warning by US Producers 
37 -1.14%  -1.94*  14:23  -1.09 
event 2  Agreement Reached in Principle 
  37 -1.01%  -2.13*  10:27  -2.41*** 
event 3  Canada Finalizes the Agreement 
 37  -2.96%  -3.52***  12:25  -1.75** 
 
  
* significant at 10% confidence interval level; **  significant at 5 % confidence interval level;  














Table 8: Stock Price Response for the all the events
a at 4-Digit SIC;  
Event Window (-2, +2) 
 
SIC 4-digit  Industries  Event Window No. of firms  TACA  Z STAT 
1521 
Single-family Housing Construction & 
Residential Construction, Nec  (-2,+2) 9  -5.98%  -2.74*** 
1531 Operative  Builders  (-2,+2)  11  -7.20%  -0.92 
2451 & 2452 
Mobile Homes & Prefabricated Wood 
Buildings (-2,+2)  11  -0.84%  0.01 
5211  Lumber and Other Building Materials  (-2,+2)  6  -7.79%  -1.76** 
ALL ALL  (-2,+2)  37  -5.11%  -2.03** 
 
 
* significant at 10% confidence interval level; **  significant at 5 % confidence interval level;  
*** significant at 1 % confidence interval level 
aevent 1 : US producers warn they will petition if no pact by feb15th; event 2 : Agreement in principle 
reached; event 3 : Canada finalizes the SLA agreement 
b Others consists of 4-digit SICs: 2515-Mattresses and Bedsprings; 5031-Lumber, Plywood, and Millwork; 
5271-Mobile Home Dealers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 